lost 550 MiGs in air-to-air combat as they assert (is it naïve to assume the combatants knew and accurately reported their losses?), versus the over 800 claimed by U.S. airmen. However, communist victory claims of over 1,600 U.N. aircraft destroyed, far exceeds the 150 aircraft that U.S. sources reported were lost in air-to-air combat. Clearly this gigantic discrepancy is much more than the normal overclaiming typical of aerial combat. Thus the claims issue is a controversial point, and because Zhang refers to it so often and as it supports one of his major conclusions, it requires more detailed attention. Regardless of the exact numbers, there can be little question that the U.S. airmen had air superiority (the author calls it "overwhelming air superiority," p. 203). This was significant for, as Zhang concludes, U.N. airmen prevented the communists from using their aircraft to support their troops and inflicted heavy damage on both communist personnel and material (p. 209).
Red Wings Over the Yalu is an excellent and important book. In addition to its groundbreaking character, it is well written and illustrated. Anyone wanting a fresh, well-researched, and balanced view of this subject will welcome this study. We can only hope that Zhang will continue his work and others will be encouraged to follow his impressive lead. Amphibious operations have long played an important role in British military history. Indeed, they remain one of the Royal Navy's "core capabilities" and the largest addition to the surface fleet in the last decade was the new amphibious assault carrier, HMS Ocean. While much of the history of these operations is well documented, the period immediately following the Second World War has been largely ignored. In this revision of his doctoral dissertation, Ian Speller has begun to fill that important void.
The primary goal of this well-written monograph is to discuss the reasons why the British lacked any substantial amphibious forces through the immediate postwar decade and how this situation placed significant limits on the options available when faced with various crises throughout the period. Speller begins with a brief account of British amphibious warfare through World War II and the strategic theory behind it. His account is both interesting and vital to an understanding of the postwar situation. Unlike the United States Marine Corps, the British had no single service responsible for amphibious operations. Instead, they had the interservice Combined Operations Headquarters, later Amphibious Warfare Headquarters (COHQ/ AWHQ). The author rightly, and repeatedly, argues that this situation was seriously flawed in that "being the general responsibility of all, amphibious warfare was the particular responsibility of none" (p. 12).
Speller is particularly strong in his account of the organization of COHQ and the service antipathy it faced. With the severe postwar cutbacks, COHQ was the unwanted stepchild of the services, particularly the Royal Navy. While the Army wanted to plan for future operations based on a return to the Continent, as in the last war, the navy bore the brunt of the costs. The Admiralty had been suspicious of COHQ since the July 1940 appointment of irascible old Admiral Sir Roger Keyes as Director of Combined Operations; it did not relish the manpower and shipping requirements for such an unglamorous role. This lack of urgency and the severe financial restrictions were largely responsible for the lack of operational capability. The consequences of this in the Abadan and Suez crises are also well explained.
This book is not without its flaws, however. For one thing, the tale is told in somewhat of a situational vacuum. There is practically no discussion of Britain's strategic situation, which would give this account a much-needed sense of "place." Furthermore, while he discusses amphibious training in a general way, Speller goes into little detail regarding the specifics of this training or the doctrine upon which it was based. Finally, Speller has an annoying habit of introducing individuals while not mentioning their first names, often not even in the index.
The more substantial of these criticisms could be due to the monograph's length. In the end, however, Speller has produced a very solid foundation upon which to begin the study of Britain's postwar amphibious policy and organization. This book will be a useful addition to staff college and other service libraries. It should also be useful to those interested in the postwar Royal Navy, British defense policy, and anyone interested in the formulation of policy, particularly in "joint-service" organizations. One of the aspects of war that most Americans are inclined to ignore is that while wars end and nations forget, the impact of the wars never really ends. Among these long-term effects are everything from "flashbacks" to major alterations in the social and cultural context of the nation.
In her delightfully sensitive book, Beyond the Shadow of Camptown, Professor Ji-Yeon Yuh has dramatically drawn our attention to one of the long-term and vital outcomes of America's involvement in foreign wars; the Korean war bride. Korean women who became the brides of American servicemen-black and white-and who came to the United States to live, faced an appalling adjustment. It was an adjustment like the invasion of British
